Collecting fog on El Tofo by Dale, S.
Collecting Fog on El Tofo 
 
Although fog collectors are working well in other parts of the world, 





In the early 1990s, the global news media became entranced by a small town in northern Chile that 
started drinking the fog. Newspaper reporters and television cameras were drawn by the site of the 
giant mesh collectors that trapped droplets of fog drifting in from the coast. Those droplets — 
which coalesced as an average of 15,000 litres of water a day — were piped down from the El 
Tofo mountain for use in the formerly parched community of Chungungo.  
The technology worked well and the increased water supply helped to transform the town. In fact, 
the project served as a prototype and there are now fog catchers or collectors providing water to 
communities in other areas of the world. But, more than 10 years later, in El Tofo, the nets are in a 
total state of disrepair. What caused the community of Chungungo to abandon the project that had 
brought it abundant water and high hopes for the future? And what can be learned from the El Tofo 
experience? These are questions that people close to the project are now grappling with.  
Water and a community transformed  
One reason the media reported so frequently on this project, may be because the impact was so 
direct and easy to see. In 1992, Canada's Globe and Mail reported: "Residents in this impoverished 
coastal region, who for the first time have a steady supply of clean water, call it a miracle." A 
resident told CNN the same year: "Now I can wash every day. Before I had to watch every drop. 
You really suffer without water."  
By 1995, the Economist was still marveling at the sight of a vibrant community where "gardens 
thrive on land that was once barren. Fisherman whistle and joke as they compare potatoes, peppers, 
cabbages, and maize." Pure and plentiful water, the Economist correspondent wrote, had produced 
not only vegetable gardens but better health and a new sense of optimism among Chungungo's 
citizens.  
There was hope that this "miracle" could be transplanted. "The new technology — which is cheap 
to build, easy to maintain, and requires no power — could alleviate water shortages in thousands of 
rural communities in arid and semi-arid communities around the world," suggested The Toronto 
Star, in a 1993 feature.  
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Ten years later, a good deal of that promise has been realized. The technology that was perfected at 
El Tofo — where researchers experimented with different materials and designs — has now either 
been adopted or is under study in 25 different countries. Recently, for instance, new fog collection 
projects have become operational in Yemen and central Chile, while other projects are at the 
evaluation stage in Guatemala, Haiti, and Nepal.  
Ironically, though, the prototype project in Chungungo has fallen into disrepair and disuse. By the 
summer of 2002, only nine of the 94 mesh collectors that once blanketed the mountaintop at El 
Tofo were still hanging. Cables and meshes had been carted off for use elsewhere, and the 
operator's house on the site had been dismantled. Most of the town's water supply is now hauled in, 
at much greater expense, by truck.  
Conflicting visions of community development  
In a report prepared for the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), Chilean 
consultant Carolina de la Lastra reported that municipal politicians in La Higuera (the larger 
jurisdiction of which Chungungo is a part) have begun to lobby for a pipeline that would bring 
water to the community from the Los Choros river, 20 km away. The officials have taken this 
approach because they "regard water from fog as an unreliable, irregular, and insufficient source 
for providing drinking water for Chungungo," she writes. It is nonetheless true that fog catchers 
continue to function well in other parts of Chile, where they bring water to agricultural and 
reforestation projects.  
IDRC project officer Chris Smart says the community's new desire for piped water may be an 
indication of a once-common problem where alternative technologies — like solar and wind 
power — suffer from a lack of local prestige.  
Often in developing countries, he explains, "people have certain visions of what it means to be 
developed, and one of them is that water should be brought to you by the state, and you should 
never have to think about it." Water that comes from a local source, through a system that has to be 
maintained by a local committee, may therefore be regarded as second-rate.  
The call for piped water  
Ironically, this feeling that the community was ready for piped water arose partly because of the 
Chungungo fog collectors' earlier, stunning success. Although the community, a former mining 
town, had been steadily losing inhabitants since the mine closed in 1970s, the arrival of fog water 
led to a tripling of the population. Summer homes and tourist facilities were built nearby. The 
collectors' success also seemed to breed a new economic and political momentum: Chungungo's 
new profile and global renown allowed officials to lobby successfully for electricity and telephone 
service.  
Beyond contributing to the community's ambition to move to a higher technological plateau, 
success also gave rise to practical problems. With 900 inhabitants in the town — rather than 
300 — the original number of fog-collectors could not supply as much water to each household as 
it once had. Even more unsettling, periods without fog meant depleted reservoirs and occasional 
drought in the community. Fog collectors came to be seen as an unreliable source of water.  
 
 
The road not taken  
Robert Schemenauer — one of the original designers of the Chungungo project and the current-day 
president of FogQuest, a nongovernmmental organization (NGO) that helps bring fog technology 
to arid regions — says the simplest solution to the supply problem would have been to expand the 
grid of fog collectors.  
"It's no different from any other kind of water supply system. If the community grows, you have to 
increase the supply," says Schemenauer, who is now working on a proposal to revive the El Tofo 
site.  
"The most logical response would have been to simply increase the number of fog collectors, and 
increase the size of the water reservoir. Then you'd have more water, and a larger buffer capacity to 
get this larger community through the times when there is no fog. There's essentially no limit to the 
number of fog collectors you can put up there. You can put ten times, twenty times, fifty times 
what there is now."  
Community leaders, however, clearly preferred the idea of a pipe bringing a steady flow of water 
from Los Choros — even though this project would come with an estimated price tag of one 
million US dollars.  
The question of community involvement  
The fact that there was so little long-term commitment to keeping the fog collectors functional, 
says University of Guelph rural extension professor Jorge Nef, is an indication that not enough 
preparatory work was done to determine if the community had the right mindset to sustain this type 
of technology, and how much they were willing to contribute to keep the fog collectors running. 
[See related sidebar: Taking a Multidisciplinary Approach]  
In his report on what went wrong at El Tofo, Nef recounts that "villagers were not involved in any 
significant way in [the project's] origins and development" and that there was very little study of 
their underlying attitudes and aspirations. This meant that they were inadequately informed about 
the economics of water supply and were unprepared to commit to the fog collectors' long-term 
functioning.  
But Schemenauer believes that any deficiencies in preparing the social ground for the arrival of 
this new technology, arose because of the project's unusual evolution. The original goals of the 
project, he explains, were to perfect the technology, construct an array of collectors as a pilot 
project and then to use the water to feed seedlings for a trial reforestation project on the mountain. 
The project was not initially designed or funded as a water project for a community. It was only 
after intensive lobbying by the community that funders reluctantly agreed to provide additional 
support to have the water diverted down the mountainside to the community.  
Switching gears midstream  
"El Tofo is not a typical situation," he says. "We worked on the top of the mountain for five years 
before there was any push to put a pipeline down the mountain. Normally, we work with local 
NGOs that have a long history in the community and put a strong emphasis on the social side." He 
adds that — even though there was little formal research into the social character of the 
community — community members were involved in planning through public meetings.  
In Nef's estimation, changing the purpose of the project in mid-course also helped create a 
management structure that was unclear and unstable.  
The project began as a collaboration between IDRC, Chile's National Forestry 
Corporation (CONAF), and Catholic University. Yet when the project's goal became the provision 
of drinking water, CONAF (which had no jurisdiction over consumable water) shifted its 
responsibility to the municipality and to various national and regional bureaucracies.  
This created something like organizational chaos. With up to eight stakeholders involved at one 
time, "there was no single authority looking over the whole system," writes Nef. Within an 
atmosphere of jurisdictional dispute and uncertainty (contributed to, for instance, by events such as 
the privatization of the state's rural water agency) the local committee charged with running and 
maintaining the fog collectors was unable to develop the necessary expertise or to function 
efficiently. The local committee could collect sufficient fees to pay for routine maintenance of the 
system but not for increased demands made by regional water agencies or for major repairs.  
Lessons from El Tofo  
Those who have followed the roller-coaster ride of fog collecting at El Tofo draw some clear 
lessons from the experience.  
One is that fog collecting works. Proof of this can be found in the work of a new network of 
specialists who have taken this technology to arid areas across the globe.  
The other lesson is that understanding social conditions and securing the involvement and 
commitment of local people — a factor apparently given short shift here because of special 
circumstances — is always vital to the long-term viability of a development project.  
"I think the main message," says Smart, "is that the technology may be absolutely wonderful — 
and in this case the technology works brilliantly — but there's always a social setting, and that's 
going to demand as much attention as the technical questions."  
Stephen Dale is a freelance writer based in Ottawa.  
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Taking a Multidisciplinary Approach 
For many researchers, the traditional, monodisciplinary approach to science has outlived its 
usefulness — particularly with respect to research in the developing world.  
Increasingly, the approach to research is more fluid: applied, cross-disciplinary, heterogeneous, 
and non-hierarchical. In practice, this means researchers problem-solve around an issue rather than 
through a rigid code of practice associated with a specific scientific discipline. It also means they 
may work in multidisciplinary teams.  
"Imagine that you're trying to improve production in a village wood lot," says Tim Dottridge, 
Director of IDRC's Special Initiatives Division. "In addition to foresters, you might have a social 
anthropologist and — since men and women have different interests in the wood lot — socio-
economic and gender specialists on your team."  
IDRC's shift in programing  
For the first 25 years of its existence, IDRC conducted its programs along fairly traditional sectoral 
lines. In fact, by the early 1990s, it had 55 separate sub-programs delivered by seven program 
divisions and six regional offices — all with separate budgets. By 1995, however, the shift towards 
a multidisciplinary approach was complete, and the Centre has never looked back.  
"A lot of organizations have tried to embrace a cross-cutting approach without changing their 
internal structures," says Dottridge. "We went further, and truly attempted to transform the 
organization. Our approach helps ensure that we practice what we preach. We expect Southern 
researchers to take a multidisciplinary approach, and we're organized in multidisciplinary teams 
ourselves to assess the proposal properly."  
While IDRC has been influenced by international trends in research, its unique experience and 
circumstances have also been a motivating factor in the shift towards multidisciplinary teams.  
The role of evaluation  
The first seeds were planted back in 1978 with the creation of an Office of Planning and 
Evaluation, and the subsequent integration of those functions with the work of the program 
divisions. By 1986, the accumulated evaluation work, along with analysis of the external context, 
led to the first policy shift. A strategic review stressed the "connectedness" of the various elements 
of development, along with the need for greater coherence in programming.  
The review reflected the Board of Governors' ongoing concern about the open-ended nature of 
programming. Still, while IDRC tried to draw up divisional objectives in 1986, programs received 
budget allocations without the requirement of a multi-year plan or any specific objectives. And in 
the 1990s, while IDRC was describing its programs in terms of sustainable development — 
especially after the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992 — program delivery was essentially unchanged. 
Meanwhile, evaluations could not conclusively demonstrate that disparate projects added up to 
more than the sum of their parts.  
 
In 1995, the Government of Canada made widespread cuts to its programs, including IDRC's work. 
In response, the Centre decided to cut staff and concentrate on fewer research areas. It produced a 
plan for a more focused program that would lead to measurable results — a decision that led to the 
creation of Program Initiatives (PIs) as the primary vehicles to fund Southern researchers and 
research institutions.  
Program initiatives  
Instead of focussing on single disciplines or sectors such as economics, fisheries, or earth sciences 
to solve problems, PIs first look at the problem, and then consider what knowledge is necessary to 
solve it. When Southern researchers and research institutions submit funding proposals, for 
example, PI teams review them to see how closely they fit with the PIs' objectives and priorities. 
Often, the initial proposal is sketchy and the PI team encourages the applicant to take a more 
integrated approach. The team also strives to expand the networks to include members of civil 
society, policy makers, and extension agents who can help define the problem and set the research 
agenda.  
"The government cuts may have been the final push, but IDRC was already moving in the 
direction of a true multidisciplinary approach," says Dottridge. "What's remarkable about the 
transition is that we were effectively undertaking three major changes at once. We were 
downsizing our operations by cutting staff. We were restructuring our operations. And we were 
reorienting our thinking. Many organizations have made these changes individually. Few have 
attempted them at the same time.  
"It hasn't been an easy transition, and the system is not perfect. There is always room to improve 
how we assess and manage projects. But we've positioned ourselves to be a model for a way of 
working. When we insist on a cross-disciplinary approach to research in the field, we're walking 
the talk." 
 
